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PREFACE 
Although the scope of this paper, from February of 1647 to 
January of 1649, would seem rather limited, the actual impact of 
Leveller principles and methods was felt during this short span of 
time. After the final Agreement of the People in early 1649, the 
movement seemed to center around personal attacks, reiteration of 
previous ideas, and defensive measures. The establishment of the 
Commonwealth, under the thumb of Oliver Cromwell, left behind all 
the Leveller plans of government, which had been discussed and 
approved by the Agitators and the Army Council. 
Other aspects of the Leveller movement, such as their concept 
of religious toleration, could have received greater attention, but it 
was not felt necessary to the sense of the paper. Likewise, the 
political situation and intrigues of the period could have been 
covered in a more thorough manner, but only the events pertinent to 
the Army-Leveller relationship were explained in detail. 
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Personifying the ideals of the Levellers, John Lilburne probably 
dominated the comment and activity of the party over the extent of his 
actual importance.1 By combining the emotional state of a religious 
2 
zealot with the philosopher's appeal to reason, Lilburne always attracted 
attention. For with a maniac's disregard for his personal welfare, Lil-
burne fought for liberty and justice and became the fiery heart of the 
movement. While this popular idol did become a threat to the Presby-
terian Parliament and to Oliver Cromwell, nevertheless, his reported 
defiance of all authority, his egotism, and his vindictiveness caused a 
just historian of the Levellers to state that Lilburne "sacrificed 
public causes to personal resentment. 112 United with Lilburne in this 
fight were a group of well-educated men of middle or merchant class 
origins. Uncolorful and retiring, William Walwyn, often abused for his 
lack of religious convictions, was accused of everything from blasphemy 
to murder.3 These two men along with Wildman, the spokesman for the 
party at the Army Council debates, Overton, a signer and promoter of 
various petitions and pamphlets, Sexby, Rainsborough, and a few other 
supporters from the Army and London comprised the Leveller leadership. 
Too idealistic and progressive to be practical, the Levellers 
p. 6. 
1Theodore Calvin Pease, The Leveller Movement (Washington, 1916), 
2c. H. Firth, "John Lilburne," The Dictiona:g of National Bio-
graphy, XI, 1129. 
3c. H. Firth, ''Willia•·n Walwyn," The Dictionary of National ~­
graphy, XX, 741. 
3 
could demonstrate the source of their principles and demands to be from 
legal theories and from the growing tradition of "religious populism. 114 
Religious separation and dissent meant individuality rode rampant, as 
men found that the right to seek truth in the scripture led to the 
privilege of questioning authority and to a new respect for the rights 
of men.5 Out of Independency came these important intellectual princi-
ples: first, the priesthood and equality of believers and second, the 
liberty of free inquiry.6 Utilizing the experience of the Protestant 
dissent, the Levellers had the skills, channels of communication, and 
organization to change ideas into action. 
With the Bible in one hand and Coke's Institutes in the other, 
Lilburne equated legal theories with the religious concepts of separa-
tism.7 Yet while his ideals were concerned with the preservation of the 
common, fundamental law, many Levellers wished to discount precedence 
and to move in turn to a political philosophy of reason and natural 
rights. Therefore, this step in theory led the Levellers beyond the 
redress of grievances, even beyond the return to Anglo-Saxon laws before 
the hated Norman Conquest, to the claim for the sovereignty of the 
people and "the pursuit of rights because they ought to exist.n8 Con-
V Lwilliam Haller, The Rise of Puritanism (New York, 1937), p. 260. 
V' 'Ibid., p. 268. 
~ 6G. P. Gooch, English Democratic Ideas in ~· Seventeenth Century 
(New York, 1959), p. 8. 
v/?christopher Hill, Puritanism and Revolution (London, 1962), p. 28. 
~bid., p. 75. 
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sequently, if any institution or ruling body was not completely repre-
sentative, it forfeited its sovereignty, and the people had no compul-
sian to obey. Raising a contest over representation and franchise, the 
Levellers pleaded for those natural rights in opposition to the rights 
of property, upheld by law and the army leaders. 
Finding themselves leaders of an opposition aroup, the political 
malcontents worked to win support for their system and party, which soon 
acquired a popular appellation. Usually used derogatorily, the term 
Leveller, which at first was denied by the group, was applied by writers 
with various interpretations. In July 1647, Cromwell was forced to move 
against the Presbyterian Party, and the King had refused the~~-
posals. 
~ At this tiJne [there wa~.7 a new faction grown up in the anny 
••• called Levellers; who spoke indolently and confidently 
against the King and Parliament and the great officers of the 
army, • • • and declared that all degree of men should be 
levelled, and an equality should be established, both in title 
and estate throughout the kingdom.9 
Though the party was prominent in the Ar~ before the Putney debates at 
the end of October, it was there that the term Leveller was given to a 
follower of Lilburne and did finally win acceptance by the party.10 In 
a confusion of names, for there were 11other sorts of men, going then 
9Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, quoted in Wilbur Cortez Abbott, 
ed., The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, 1599-1649 (Cambridge, 
1937)-;l, 493. - - - -
10william Haller and Godfrey Davies, eds., The Leveller Tracts, 
1647-1653 (New York, 1944), p. 1. 
under the name of Levellers, 1111 the actual party could be distinguished 
from other republicans or religious reformers, by its image as a certain 
group of radicals gathered around Lilburne. 
11John Lilburne, "Legall Fu.ndamentall Liberties, 11 Haller and 
Davies, etds., Leveller Tracts, p. 424. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DEVELOR1ENT OF PROTEST AGAINST PARLIAMENT 
Political philosophies and political reformers are rarely created 
in a political vacuum; the proper solution of happenings and personali-
ties, accompanied by a catalyst of one disturbing event is usually neces-
sary to transform a group of radicals into a formidable party. There-
fore,we see that not until the actions of Parliament against the Army 
had brought on the necessity of petitions, did the Leveller part~ take 
form and blend its program with that of the army agitation. For with 
the defeat of Charles .I, the soldiers of the New Model Army had expec-
ted Parliament to settle the nation without the abuses and oppressions 
of tyranny. Harboring no thoughts ~f disloyalty, the soldiers would 
have followed the dictates of their officers in quiet obedience but for 
the cool disregard of Parliament for the welfare and payment of its Army. 
Direct interference in politics was forced upon the Ar.my by the Presby-
terian Party, who felt themselves losing ground under threats of Inde-
pendency and Royalism. With the country in great debt, with an old 
tradition of civil law, and with the danger of a well-disciplined mili-
tary force of Independents, Parliament quickly planned to disband the 
Army. On February 18, 1647, the plan to reduce the infantry was intro-
duced in the House; a plan whereby the cavalry would be left dependent 
on a weak, undisciplined group of trained-bands or civilian soldiers. 
Since the defense of Ireland now fell on Parliament, many of the soldiers 
were to be impressed or enlisted for service.12 Of the 1,000 horse 
soldiers, 400 were to be dismissed, and 14,000 foot soldiers were to be 
7 
sent to garrisons. A serious mistake was to deprive any member of Par-
liament~his commission in the Army.13 To further divide the troops, the 
Houses discussed sending 8,000 of the infantry, 3,000 of the horse, and 
1,200 dragoons to Ireland.14 ~ile the plan for disbandment was insult 
enough to the victorious Army, the attempts to oust Fairfax and the 
attack on Cromwell in March left the Army .with a homogeneity of resent-
ment. 
In spite of dissatisfaction among the rank and file over disband-
ing, strong encouragement from their officers, particularly Cromwell, 
would probably have brought the loyal well-disciplined soldiers to obey 
the dictates of Parliament and the wishes of the nation. Expressing 
this confidence, Cromwell stated," 1'1 know the army will disband and lay 
down their arms at your door, whenever you will command them. ,'J..5 However 
as further encroachment on their rights, the soldiers were offered only 
a promise of payment of their arrears for a short time)with the rest in 
debentures. With the assessments not strictly collected and the accounts 
~12samuel R. Gardiner, Histo;y of the Great Civil War, 1642-1649 
(London, lts93), III, 217-18. -- - --
03J. R. Tanner, English Constitutional Conflicts of the Seven-
teenth Century, 1600-1689 (Cambridge, 1957), p. iLl. 
l4Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers, 
Venetian Series (London, 1927), XXVII, 309. 
15Gardiner, History, m, 222. 
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ill-kept and seldom paid, the possibilities of collecting the arrears of 
18 weeks for the foot and 43 for the horse and dragoons were slim.16 As 
a result of Parliament's failure to pay the soldiers and officers, the 
Anny spoke out in the tradition of Englishmen'~ through a petition to 
Commons. With due respect, the mild, unpolitical list of economic de-
mands was presented through their general~-Fairfax. The Humble Petition 
of the Officers and Souldiers, on March 21, 1647, requested redress of 
these grievances: an act of indemnity, their arrears, no impressment to 
foreign lands, pensions for widows and orphans, and money to meet expen-
ses.17 Much to the despair of the soldiers, the officers refused to 
hear their complaints and supported the act of disbandment. "And lest 
mere suspicion of their compliance with the Army • • • should be turned 
to their prejudices, they were willing ••• to suppress the soldiers 
first most innocent and modest petition.n18 
· .. ~~ rWhen: the army officers refused the leadership of their men, 
direct action became necessary. In a meeting with the Commissions of 
Parliament at Saffron Walden, March 21, the officers' request for volun-
teers for Ireland was met by a rebuttal of demands. A reply was neces-
sary on four issues: arrears, payment, service, and command in Ireland.19 
~6Tanner, Constitutional Conflicts, p. 141. 
v((7Gardiner, History, III, 225. 
18 John vlildman, Putney Projects, quoted in Abbott, ed., \'l'ritings 
and Speeches, I, 437. 
19Abbott, ed., Writings and Speeches, I, 435. 
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Following this meeting, Lilburne attacked Cromwell for his betrayal to 
the Army and his stand for obedience to Parliament. nr am informed • • • 
that you and your agents ••• will not suffer them to petition till 
they have laid down their arms whensoever they shall command them. • • • 
Accursed be the day that ever the House of Commons bribed you with a vote 
of 2,500 f to betray and destroy us. 1120 While a formal protest was 
still iri the making and the Leveller party unsupported, the irrepressi-
ble Lilburne expressed his feeling against the mighty Cromwell. 
Having made no effort to meet the demands of the Army, Parliament 
gave up its one chance for disbandment or alliance with that powerful 
group. To create a single grievance, behind which all dissenting par-
ties could unite, was assuredly a suicidal course of action. To carry 
this course further on the road to destruction, the Commons passed an 
extreme resolution, introduced on March 30 by the hated Denzil Ho.lles, 
that 11All those who shall continue in their distempered condition ••• 
shall be proceeded against as enemies of the State. 1121 Cromwell was not 
only deprived of his commission by an earlier declaration, but was now 
threatened with imprisonment. 22 There was no longer a choice; Cromwell 
had to accept the leadership of th~ Ar.my and fight for their demands. 
By alienating not only the soldiersJbut also the leading parliamentary 
20John Lilburne, Jonah's f!l, quoted in Abbott, ed., \'lritings ~ 
Speeches, I, 435. 
21Abbott, ed., Writings and Speeches, I, 437. 
22Ibid. 
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allies from the Army, the Commons sealed ·itEr.· fate. For men accused of 
sedition or treason now took thought to an organized resistance and 
entrance into the political arena. 
I th. th f M h hi h b hbetween . n l.S same mon o arc , w c saw an open reac . .t'arb.a-
ment and the Anny, the radical group of Levellers also presented a peti-
tion to Parliament. Very different in content and tone, the Large Peti-
tion of ~ Levellers was attacked and burned by the common hangman. 
Such action was in direct violation to the right of petition, but the 
list of grievances which the party presented did amount to a political 
manifesto or statement of constitutional reform. Unimproved by the war 
for justice, certain oppressions still disturbed the nation's defenders 
of liberty. Among the issues were illegal monopolies, religious con-
formity, tithes, imprisonment without due process, the negative voices 
of the King and Lords, forced oaths and self-witness, complicated and 
foreign law procedure, and imprisonment for debt. 23 More under the 
influence of Lilburne than other Levellers, the plea concentrated on the 
legality and precedence of rights. Most importantly, it was the initial 
declaration of party doctrines. With no drastic change ·proposed i.n the 
structure or sovereignty of government, the petition was only a small 
measure of later declarations and pleas, which were founded on the philo-
sophical concept of natural rights. 
Lilburne 1s early influence also extended into the rank and file 
~;A. s. P. Woodhouse, ed., Puritanism~ Liberty (London, 1950), 
pp. )ltl-321. 
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of the soldiers, whose discontent with the Commons was uniting them in a 
strong determination not to yield. Relating the greedy desires of the 
If Godly party11 or Presbyterians, the anonymous pamphlet !:; New-~ 
Stratagem, from the radicals in the Army, was inspired by Lilburne. 24 
.By April, army manifestoes were filled with ideas of the extremists, and 
the A:rmy ,was said to be "one Lilburne throughout. 1125 From writing to 
demonstration, the orderly petition and rumbling pamphlet led to a show 
of unity. When the Commissioners visited on Saffron Walden on April 15 
to appease the soldiers and to recruit volunteers to Ireland, they were 
met by a mighty cry, " ':Alll Alll Fairfax and Cromwell and we all go 1 11f6 
Worried about the exclusion of those officers from command, the soldiers 
were willing to follow them into service. On this same day, April 15, 
the first mention was made of representation from the troops in the form 
of two Agitators from each regiment. Feelinihf!e Council of '\iar, com-
posed of officers,w~ack in presenting the views of the Army, they 
wanted to present them directly.27 Any such concept of organization 
with secret agentsand codes and representation of the common soldiers 
surely came from an infiltration of Leveller ideas. 
~4aardiner, History, III, 235. 
25Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 3. 
~26Gardiner, History, III, 234. 
'27 V Ibid., p. 237. 
CHAPTER III 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE LEVELLERS IN THE OIDANIZATION 
AND ACTIVITY OF THE AGITATORS 
Perhaps more than any other act:iDn.of theLevellers, the method, 
organization, and doctrines of agitation which the soldiers utilized 
was the greatest debt owed by the Army to that secular, democratic 
party. 1ihile furthering the cause of the soldiers, the Levellers i~ 
proved their own status of recognition, which enabled them to become a 
formidable threat in later months. 28 Though many historians characteris-
tically disagree on the total impact and long-range influence of the 
Levellers, most do agree on this one point. The party inserted some of 
its principles and techniques into the Army through the Agitators and 
the Army Council. "Inevitably, the Levellers took an important part, 
though one that cannot be precisely described, in supporting, even in 
helping to direct, the campaign of resistance which began forthwith. 1129 
With this dangerous new element, a group committed to satisfaction of 
demands and the Leveller ideas of equality and justice, present in the 
Army, concessions were too late. Even a resolution passed by the Com-
mons on April 27 to pay six weeks' arrears to disbanded men who didn't 
go to Ireland was taken lightly.3° 
I/2Bwoodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, IJ.J.7. 
29Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 9. 
30Abbott, ed., Writings~ Speeches, I, 439. 
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After the decision to organize was made, small gifts from Parlia-
ment couldn't stop the movement. In a letter to the generals on April 
28, 1647, the agents or Agitators, elected from eight regiments of horse, 
discussed the choosing of and meeting with two representatives from 
every regiment in the Army. By refusing to respond, the Grandees demon-
strated that they themselves had no idea of organizing the rank and file 
for resistance. Cromwell, Ireton, and Fairfax had certainly not given 
up hopes of a vindication from Parliament or even of the restoration of 
a slightly limited monarchy. On April 30, the officers sent a letter to 
Commons requesting that their reputations be cleared. With indignation 
and yet with a growing fear of overthrow, the members offered promises 
of arrears, debentures, and indemnities. In reply, the generals in-
structed their officers to take notice of the news from the Commons on 
the payment of arrears and indemnities and to make a report "concerning 
the present temper and disposition of the regiment.n3l Nevertheless, 
with the month of May came both the reluctant recognition of the Agi-
tators by the officers and the election of representatives from the 
infantry as well as the horse. In contrast to the hopes of the officers, 
the Agitators were steadily growing in strength.32 
With such progress being made, fears that the Levellers would 
push the Army into more serious discontent and uprising caused the 
3~etter from Cromwell, Ireton, and Skippon to Colonels or chief 
officers of the respective regiments, May 3, 1647, quoted in Abbott, 
ed., Writings and Speeches, I, 441. 
v/.32Gardiner, History, III, 244-49. 
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Grandees to make a surface alliance with the Agitators.33 Due to this 
uneasiness, 223 commissioned officers published the Declaration of the 
Army on May 15,34 in an attempt to discourage soldiers from entering the 
political arena on the advice of the radicals. Reaching to the heart of 
their uniform dissatisfaction with Parliament, the officers complained 
of arrest without the consent of Fairfax, suggested definite amounts of 
arrears to be paid, asked permission to publish vindication, and con-
firmed the right of troops to petition their officers.35 Impressed by 
their demands, Cromwell defended the Declaration to Parliament on May 21. 
With some intent on compromise, Parliament passed an ordinance on May 25, 
1647, stating that army accounts were "to be audited and cast up during 
their services in the said Army: • • • and to give out Debenters accord-
ingly unto the said (l;fficers and Souldiers.•r36 Yet two problems re-
mained: first, the Army could not be convinced to disband short of 
redress of all grievances, and second, the accounts and assessments were 
never properly handled and completed. 
The necessity of compromise and redress of grievances was grudg-
ingly but finally admitted by Cromwell and Ireton. Therefore they were 
V33Hill, Puritanism and Revolution, p. 175. 
3Lr.ray 15, 1647, is the date given by Abbott, but May 16, 1647, is 
quoted by Gardiner. On the basis of preference to primary source and 
due to the specific mention of a meeting at Saffron Walden on May 15, I 
have used this as the date of the document. 
35Abbott, ed., \iritings and Speeches, I, 444-45. 
36c. H. Firth and R. s. Rait, eds., Acts and Ordinances of the 
Interregnum, 1642-1660 (London, 1911), I, 9~ - - --
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anxious to maintain discipline and to prevent any possibility of extrem-
ism or anarchy. Careful guidance and dominance over the Agitators was 
better assured by bringing them into a carefully chosen Council of the 
Army, consisting of all the general officers, two commissioned officers 
and two enlisted men or Agitators from each regiment.37 By combining 
the Council of War and the group of Leveller-inspired Agents, the offi-
cers could out-number the radical reformers. In actuality, the greatest 
influence of the Agitators existed outside the Council, where the spokes-
men for the soldiers could utilize the press and an organized procedure 
of petitioning in the manner of the Levellers. ~le the officers con-
centrated on quieting the economic and immediate demands of the Army, 
the Agitators involved themselves in politics to seek justice in the 
settlement of the kingdam.38 In a circular to the soldiers on May 19, 
the .Agitators stressed unity by saying, W![f you do but stand ••• nor 
do anything without the consent of the whole anny, you will do good to 
yourselves, your officers, and the whole kingdoml-~9 
Outside of this infiltration into the Army, the Levellers' pro-
cedure of protest, from the Large Petition in March to the organized 
protest in the Army in May, consisted of two more petitions to the Com-
mons. By recognizing the Commons as 111the supreme authority,n40 the 
37c. H. Firth, Cromwell's Army (London, 1902), p. 353. 
0~foodhouse, ed. Puritanism and Liberty, (J.y. 
V39Gardiner, History, III, 254. 
V 40Ibid., p. 255. 
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March petition had stepped too far in the direction of a radical mani-
festo, such as those typical of the autumns of 1647 and 1648. Since it 
appeared as an encroachment on the privilege of the influential classes, 
and since the petition's demands had a chance of military support, the 
Commons was particularly anxious to be rid of the Army and to suppress 
the petition. Two disciples of Lilburne were immediately imprisoned, an 
action which brought forth a second petition the next day~_March 20. As 
a culmination to the March petition, the Levellers sent a third plea on 
May 20 to the Commons to demand the liberation of the imprisoned support-
ers.41 The order to burn this petition was the signal for the complete 
absorption of the Leveller program into the Army protest.h2 From Hay to 
the end of the Army Council debates at Putney early in November, Leveller 
ideas could be found almost solely in the pronouncements from the Army. 
Communication transpired from the Levellers to the Agitators, and then to 
the people. Only when the leaders of the party found the army officers 
untrustworthy and in opposition to some of the Leveller doctrines did 
they publish outside the name of the Army. 
~41Ibid., pp. 255-5B. 
1 '') '~Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 1. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ARMY ENGAGE21ENTS Al'ID ProPOSALS FOR THE 
SET~ffiNT OF THE KINGDOM 
Despite the petitions, the explosive temper of the Army, and the 
election of Agitators, Parliament, fearing an Army plot against the 
King, determined to proceed with disbandment beginning June 1, 1647. In 
order to prevent a united effort of disobedience, separate rendezvous 
were assigned for the final muster to disband or to send troops to Ire-
land. Yet resistance did occur, and Ireton properly expressed a dread 
of the consequences. 43 As he.· had dreaded, a strong defiance was pro-
posed in the form of a general rendezvous at Newmarket. Commissioners 
from Parliament were recalled, and the two forces were in open conflict. 
In spite of all evidence of the break, Ireton believed the Army to be 
still loyal if only the Houses would reform. Indicating that neither he 
nor Cromwell had led this movement, he wrote to the latter, "I assure 
you that passionate and violent counsel which is given thus to provoke 
the .army will in time be apprehended to be destructive, or my observa-
tion fails me. n44 
Yet reform and satisfaction from the Commons was not in the realm 
of possibility, for there was a formula of Leveller machinery plus the 
spirit of resistancelpouring from the one source of domestic military 
v 43Gardiner, History, III, 261. 
\/44rbid. 
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might, which was the magic solution needed to weaken the Houses beyond 
repair. Indicating their secondary position, Parliament voted to hold 
the most violent Leveller petition, that of June 2, for consideration in 
committee. Cooperation of the party with the Agitators was hereby re-
vealed in the demands of the petition, which called for the redress of 
grievances in the Army. The vote on June 3 to consider the payment of 
full arrears and to strike off the resolution calling the soldiers 
enemies of the state was another show of weakness. Such reform would 
have at least hampered the efforts of the Levellers in the Army. In 
desperation the Presbyterians invited the Scots to invade England 
against the New Model.L5 If the rendezvous at Newmarket was the Army's 
sign of revolt, Parliament's invitation placed the soldiers as enemies 
of the kingdom. 
In the position of a political force, the Army had to quickly 
draw up a declaration of its intentions. Thrown into a mass gathering 
of distempered soldiers, the Army Council, especially the Agitators, had 
to work to achieve unity and order. By placing all future decisions of 
disbandment or any actions to be taken in the hands of the Council, the 
troops felt they had a slight voice in their future. If the Army Coun-
cil did nothing else, it at least preserved discipline and pacified the 
soldiers in times of crisis. A shaky but acceptable agreement was 
reached at Newmarket on June 5, when the Solemn Engagement was signed. 
It was decided to allow the Council to decide when the condition of full 
L5Abbott, ed., Writings~ Speeches, I, L51. 
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redress was met and it was safe to disband. Until that time, all regi-
ments were to remain disobedient to the legislative orders.46 With the 
signing of this statement, the change in the Arrrry revealed that the 
soldiers had been led from petitioning as humble subjects into the 
machinery and tone of a revolutionary party. In the opinion of the rank 
and file, they were not "a mere mercinary Arrrry, hired to serve any 
Arbitrary power of a State; but called • • • to the defense of our owne 
and the peoples just rights, and liberties.n47 Though the practical 
aspects of the Engagement came from Cromwell, and though the Army Coun-
cil was dominated by the officers, the nature of such a document was the 
evidence of Leveller influence on the Agitators.48 An even stronger 
indication of the radical infiltration was the following of party lines 
on the state of nature. By defying the demands of the people, Parlia-
ment had relinquished its sovereignty and had placed each man left to 
his own authority. Mutual agreement and unity in the Army now had be-
come necessary for reason and safety. 49 The Grandees were anxious to be 
lawful and traditional in their task of settling the kingdom; the Level-
lers were determined to give all men a voice in their welfare and in 
governing the country.5° 
V 46woodhouse, ed., Purl tanism and Liberty, /J.i/-!J.Jil. 
47Henry Ireton, "A Declaration, or Representation, 11 Haller and 
Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 55. 
0 8aardiner, History, Ill, 2eo •. 
49Pease, Leveller Movement, p. ll55 • 
.50ibid., p. 179. 
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In a more definite statement of democratic ideals and fundamental 
rights, the Army laid out its program for securing the kingdom. ! 
Declaration,~ Representation, printed June 14, 1647, was composed by 
Ireton, but expressed the opinions of the more radical rank and file. 
To clarify their position on disbandment, to state their grievances, and 
to soot~e the suspicions of the nation was the expressed purpose of the 
Declaration. Since Parliament had obviously intended to break or divide 
the Army, and since no reasonable answer was given to i, its· requests, 
the Army felt justified in -.:; its disobedience and desires for the future 
security of the people. Those things necessar.1 "to the same ends, of 
common right, freedom, peace and safetyu5l distinguished this document 
from earlier petitions of the Army. Dealing with Parliament, the Decla-
ration urged the purging of unjust members, set a date for dismissal, 
and ordered new elections on a more representative distribution of seats. 
Along with the usual demand for payment and the confirmation of the 
right of petition, this publication showed its colors as a political 
manifesto by claiming the right of religious differences within the 
establishment. J.ltlilitary grievances were put in the background in pre-
ference to constitutional principles. Convinced that they were expres-
sing the desires of the people, the Army's spokesman included the state-
ment of assurance, "as we have already found the concurrent sence of 
the people in divers counties by their Petitions to the Generall."52 As 
51Henry Ireton, "A Declaration, or Representation," Haller and 
Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 62. 
52Ibid., p. 63. 
21 
one in a series with the Houses, begun March, 1647, and continued 
through the summer and fall, the Army Declaration was an important mile-
stone on the way to Army dominance.53 
Not satisfied with ·the document alone, the radicals also pushed 
for a march against London. Army leaders, however, were very conscious of 
the people's fear of military dictatorship and were extremely hesitant. 
I 
Despite the officers' claims for peace, their letter of warning to city 
authorities presented the first real threat of force.54 The impatience 
of the soldiers, in contrast to the cautious legality of the officers, 
was doubtless due to radical insistence of the Leveller influence. Con-
vinced of his mission to lead the Army, Lilburne declared himself to 
Cromwell on July 1, 1647. Seeing that the Commons 11rmuld not heare, 
regard, or receive, but burnt, or sleighted all those just Petitions; 
••• I applyed my selfe vigorously unto the honest blades, the private 
Souldiers, I meane, of the Army.n55 
To hold back the energetic Lilburne and to pacify the restless 
soldiers led by the Agitators, the officers called a Council of War at 
Reading to consider the march. Immediately the Agitators demanded a 
place in the debate~, and the Council of War, composed only of officers, 
became the Army Council on July 16, 1647. 56 Army secretary John Rushworth 
53Ibid., pp. 51-63. 
54Abbott, ed., vlritings ~ Speeches, I, 459-460. 
55Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 9. 
56 Abbott, ed., 1-Tritings ~ Speeches, I, 473-475. 
wrote in a newsletter, 11It is not more than necessary they {.the Agita-
tor~ should be ~admitteS7 considering the influence they have upon the 
souldiers.u57 A significant turning point and a concession to the dis-
sident party in the Army, the inclusion of the Agitators in the Reading 
debates proved that the Leveller-minded group had become essential in 
the actions of the New Model. Among the five points insisted upon by 
the Agitators were: first, the exclusion and impeachment of eleven 
delinquent members, second, the return of the London militia into loyal 
hands, and third, the release of certain prisoners, particularly John 
Lilburne. With the adverse party in command in London, a march was 
necessary to enforce their points and to show the effectiveness of the 
Army.5B Though the Agitators "prest with reason and earnestness,n59 
the officers didn't feel that the situation was serious enough to war-
rant a show of force. Exclusive power in the militia could have been 
dangerous. In the conclusion of the debate over a march, the Agitators 
and the officers were able to reach a basic agreement on all the propos-
als, but Cromwell felt that the means they advocated was improper. Only 
when the good of the nation could be served in no other way was the use 
of military might wise. Therefore, it was desirable to consider first 
"what it is that we intend to do with that power when we have it. 1160 To 
'
7 ~·' p. 475. 
0Bwoodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty:, PP• 409 .... 410, 
59Abbott, ed., Writings and Speeches, I, 475. 
0<'wocdhouse, ed. , Puritanism and Liberty, p. 411. 
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follow up the challenge of power, the Council began to debate on the 
then uncompleted Heads of Proposal. 
Fairly well satisfied with the debate and in deference to their 
officers, the Agitators gave in on the question of a march and began to 
debate on July 17 the proposed Heads. As an Agent, Allen expressed the 
feeling of inadequacy of the common soldier as a politician, for he saw 
that "we are most of us but young statesmen. n61 From this simple admis-
sion, Allen gave a clue into one of the underlying reasons for the strong 
Leveller influence in the Army and particularly among the rank and file. 
The common soldier, who had no rights of franchise and minimum experience 
in government, was easily attracted to the party that would identif,y 
itself with the lowly men of the kingdom and would fight for their eco-
nomic welfare. Knowing their inexperience, Lilburne was dedicated to 
the cause of arousing people to their lost liberties. On the other hand, 
neither the political opportunist Cromwell, nor the cold man of reason 
Ireton, nor the "old, beaten, subtle foxes of Westminster1162 could be 
unreservedly swayed by the appeal of the Levellers. Realizing this fact, 
their leader continually warned the Agitators to be steadfast, to be 
watchful for deceptions qy the Grandees, and not to be fooled by the 
apparent willingness of the officers to work with them. 63 
~lrbid., p. 421. 
v6'2Richard Overton, quoted in Y.Toodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Lib-
erty, p. 334. 
63Pease, The Leveller Movement, P• 126. 
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As a follow-up to previous declarations and as an assurance to 
the nation, the Heads of Proposals, completed August 1, 1647, was a sen-
sible summary of the proposed settlement of the kingdom. Handled com-
pletely by the Grandees, the fifteen Heads and five supplementary arti-
cles took no thought for the fundamental rights of the people, but in-
tended an agreement with Parliament and the King. Though it did provide 
for the King's privileges and responsibilities, including the right to 
call or dissolve a Parliament, it also included a few provisions for 
legal rights, soldiers' grievances, and the right to petition.64 The 
fact that such things were included indicates that Ireton found it 
necessary to heed the Levellers on certain issues. Ireton's sincerity 
in the debates revealed that he was not just an opportunist like Crom-
well, but was slightly sympathetic to the notion of reform. While the 
radicals were thoroughly democratic and individualistic in principle, 
the moderate officer was dependent on legality and the authority of the 
state.65 Feeling that the officers had made too many concessions, parti-
cularly in granting the negative voice to the King and Lords, the Level-
lers showed their dissatisfaction. "I know no other use of these Pro-
posals than to support the tottering reputation of the grand officers in 
the minds of such as shall not discern their vanity. 1166 By all evidence 
then and in the chain of events still to follow, the author of the state-
ment in Putney Projects has some justification for his condemnation. 
64aardiner, ed., "Heads of Proposals," Constitutional Documents, 
pp. 316-319. 
v05woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, p. 98. 
~6John Wildman, P~tneh Projects, quoted in Woodhouse, ed., ~­
tanism ~Liberty, pp. 27- 28. 
CHAPI'ER V 
THE PRESENTATION AND RESULTS OF THE CASE OF THE ARMit 
IN THE PUTNEY DEBATES 
Political agitation by the Levellers, both inside and outside the 
Army in the autumn of 1647, was concerned with the growing distrust of 
the Grandees. Though great strides had been made in their influence, 
the party leaders were discontented with the results of the engagements 
and the declarations, the dominance of Cromwell and Ireton in the Army 
Council, and the misuse of the Agitators. During the summer of 1647 Lil-
burne began to be suspicious of the Independents. Even though Cromwell 
had acted on the previous proposal to purge the Parliament of eleven 
delinquent members, yet his frequent visits and negotiations with the 
King caused the Leveller to regard him as a hypocrite.67 These two men, 
who fought for, with, and against each other at various times in their 
careers, met curiously on September 6 in the Tower where Lilburne was 
imprisoned. Cromwell, who carne to him hoping that he could be won over 
to the side of the Independents, found instead that ~itb~rn~ regarded 
him as an enemy and could conceive of no political compromise. In re-
turn for his release, Lilburne promised to leave the country if justice 
and liberty were assured. Rightfully cautious, Cromwell feared that the 
radical would stir up trouble in the Army if allowed to go free. 68 
67Abbott, ed., Writings~ Speeches, I, 496-497. 
vr6a 6 Gardiner, History, III, 3 3. 
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Though only a small incident, this meeting exemplified the feeling which 
existed between the two leaders of opposing parties. The Lieutenant-
General discerned the formidable threat levelled against his Army by 
Lilburne the fanatic, who regarded the personal ambition and machina-
tions of Cromwell with contempt. After September 14, the .wily Grandee 
supported a motion in the Commons to find precedence for the Lords to 
act against the prisoner, who then appealed to the soldiers to rise up 
' 
against the "perfidious firebrand.u69 All through the month of Septem-
ber, Cromwell and Ireton continued to work for a settlement with Charles, 
who could provide a status of legality for the Army and its leaders. As 
this possibility became more remote in October, the anti-monarchial 
feeling grew, and the soldiers felt dissatisfied to the point of further 
action. 
Uncertainty in the political situation and a distempered feeling 
within the Army bred an even greater opportunity for the extremist. 
Since all powers, the King, Parliament, and the Army, had failed to 
bring peace, the Levellers wanted to do away with all existing forms of 
government and to build a new system on abstract principles. Regardless 
of attempts to pacif.r the soldiers, the Grandees were unable to stifle 
the forceful program of the movement.7° Finding a number of Agitators 
unfaithful and too passive in representing the soldiers, five regiments 
of horse elected IINew Agents."7l More under the influence of Lilburne, 
69Abbott, ed., Writings~ Speeches, I, 505. 
"J(oGardiner, History, III, 380. 
71Firth, Cromwell's Army, p. 357. 
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the new Agitators met to draw up a proposal for settlement on the prin-
ciples of certain rights and liberties. Completed on October 9, 1647, 
The ~of the Armie, written by John Wildman, was presented to Fairfax 
on October 18. Heartily disapproving of the Heads of Proposals and 
afraid that the officers were betraying the Declaration of June 14, the 
rank and file wished to present a true statement of their ideas and 
demands. They felt that there had been 11a total neglect of insisting 
positively upon the redress;· of those grievances or granting those de-
sires of the Army as Soldiers. u72 In addition to restating the same 
economic and political oppressions that had existed since the beginning 
of the Parliament versus Army struggle, the Case brought in more funda-
mental principles of government. 
Not unwilling to consider the restoration of the King, they 
demanded beforehand the security of the people's rights. With this aim 
always in mind, they desired the immediate purging of Parliament, dis-
solution within a year, a biennial meeting and election, a new system of 
constituencies, and representatives chosen by manhood suffrage. Mainly 
interested that the Case should become supreme law, the Levellers and 
-
Agitators defined the abstractions on which their theories were based. 
Original power existed in the body of the people, therefore, the truly 
representative form of government was the only just one. 11/JoiJ the 
equitie of popular safettie is the thing which justifieth all formes, or 
72 John \1/ildman, "The Case of the Army, 11 Haller and Davies, ed., 
Leveller Tracts, p. 69.-
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the change of formes for the accomplishment thereof; and no formes are 
lawfull longer then they preserve or accomplish the same.u73 Government 
exists for the good and safety of the people. 74 Yet two basic Leveller 
ideals which the Army leaders found difficult or impossible to accept 
were the equality in a voting system and the idea that the aim of gov-
ernment was the protection of the people's rights. That the two groups 
could never be reconciled on these issues, regardless of their political 
situation or interaction, was set in clear relief against the background 
of the Putney debates. 
On October 28, 1647, the Army Council was gathered at Putney to 
discuss and to pass judgment on the ~, but before a solution was 
found to the proposals, a new document was presented by the Agitators. 
Holding to the concept that all authority of government originated from 
the people, the Levellers felt it was desirable to draw up a written 
constitution, which would be the supreme law after acceptance by the 
nation. ~ Agreement of ~ People of October 2tl did not replace the 
Case, but it was formulated more as a definite statement of fundamental 
law, rather than as an explanation of Army action and grievances.75 All 
power, with the exception of certain rights specifically reserved for 
the kingdom's populace, was placed in a more representative, biennial 
Parliament. For the first time in Army declarations, there appeared a 
73Ibid. J p. 78. 
74rbid., pp. 64-87. 
~5Gardiner, History, III, 382-383. 
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list of the just rights the Levellers had been claiming for the people. 
Such basic things as freedom of conscience, equality under the law, and 
no impressment were revolutionar,y concepts to most of the nation.76 
More than any other statement, the conclusion of the Agreement revealed 
the ideals and intentions of the Levellers and their allies, the Agi-
tators, in the fall of 1647. 
These things we declare to be our native rights, ••• and re-
solved to maintain them with our utmost possibilities against 
all opposition whatsoever; • • • having long expected and dearly 
earned the establishment of the certain rules of government, are 
yet made to defend for the settlement of our peace and freedom 
upon him that intended our bondag~ ••• 77 
Accounts of the debates, which lasted from October 28 to November 
8, were not complete in their coverage by the writers. Nevertheless 
they revealed the procedure of the Council of the Army, the beliefs of 
the spokesmen for each party, and the basic differences which existed 
between the Grandees and the Levellers. For the Agitators, the debates 
presented the true test of their strengths and abilities in putting 
across the real needs and ideas of the rank and file. Therefore, much 
thought was given to the presentation of the Agreement, and the de-
baters for the party stood firm in their arguments. Never was the ulti-
mate control of Cromwell and Ireton seriously threatened, but the Agents 
and the Levellers persistently sought and gradually won acceptance for 
some of their principles. Even after the Putney debates were completed 
[Ab"Agreement of the People," Gardiner, Historz, III, 392-394. 
vn~., p. 394. 
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and the Agitators became a powerless group, the Grandees were left with 
a few democratic ideas imprinted on them. Weaknesses within the group 
of agitation were soon apparent in the form of inexperience in the task 
of political debate. With Sexby and Allen from the Agitators, and John 
Wildman, a civilian, speaking for the New Agents, the group was further 
strengthened by the radical spirit of Colonel Rainsborough and a few 
other inferior officers.78 Overton warned them of the dangerous designs 
and intended dominance of the higher officers. 11 • •• I only advise you 
to be ca~tious and wary, and keep up your betrusted power and authority, 
and let nothing be acted • • • or concluded without your consent and 
privity.n79 Always afraid of divisions in the Army, Cromwell reacted to 
the Agreement with uncertainty and suspicion. To the dissatisfaction of 
the Levellers, he found the constitution too impractical and lacking 
general, popular approva1. 8° Consequently, the complaints and concepts 
of the Agreement had to be carefully reviewed by the Army Council, and 
a decision on its approval was postponed until after debate. 
In the opening debates, the two Grandees found themselves under 
great pressure to not just criticize and refuse, but to fight the Level-
lers with principles that could unify support on the side of Independen-
cy.81 Since their victory in the war had not yet brought justice or 
78Firth, Cromwell's Armr, p • .358. 
V79Richard Overton, "An Appeal from the Commons to the Free 
People," Woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, p • .3.34. 
~OGardiner, History, III, .3tl2-J84. 
~Ibid., P• .386. 
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peace, the kingdom demanded a settlement. In this spirit the Agreement 
was drawn up and defended in the first speech of Sexby. "· •• The 
cause of our misery /J.i/ upon two things. We sought to satisfy all men, 
and it was well; but in going Libou~ to do it we have dissatisfied all 
men. ,B2 vlith particular disapproval of the negotiations with Charles 
and the compromises made to Parliament, the radicals were determined to 
settle the state with an original form of government. Before proceeding 
with a fundamental constitution, it was first necessary to be free of 
all previous engagements. As a result, the question of Ar~ commitments 
became the first point of contention and verbal opposition. wnile Crom-
well firmly believed that any past agreement was binding, the Agitators 
argued that it was not holding if now considered unreasonable or con-
trary to the good of the people. Using all manner of devices to cool 
down the fervor of the extremists at the debates, Independent leaders 
employed the contest over the engagement as a delaying technique to give 
them time to work out a more flexible, less democratic Agreement. After 
exhausting that question, both parties proceeded to rationalize their 
positions on the proposals.83 
Advocates of the document first had to demonstrate their right to 
take and to hold the liberties which they desired. Dogmatic and slight-
ly irrational, the Levellers insisted that their authority was derived 
from the natural rights of men. Any past law or agreement which was 
i/§Zwoodhouse, ed., Puritanism~ Liberty, p. 2. 
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contrar,y to the people's will was unacceptable. In rebuttal, the offi-
cers asked for proof that natural rights had ever existed and if so, 
that they had taken the specific form outlined in the radicals' plan of 
government. As a veteran political thinker, Ireton was able to maneuver 
the questions to put the Agitators on the defensive and to move the 
debate around to the center of his political theories. Inevitably, the 
problem of suffrage was brought up in the discussion and thereby became 
the most heated point of contention. Again referring to natural rights, 
the Levellers demanded manhood suffrage, because .they believed any man 
bound by the law must have a voice in its making. In contrast, Ireton 
contended that the control of the state was limited to those who had a 
stake in the nation or, in other words, who possessed property. He was 
also afraid that equal rights would lead to the concept of equal prop-
erty. In spite of Ireton's argument, the soldiers' spokesmen continued 
to press the point by asking what liberties did belong to those who had 
risked their lives for the safety of the nation. Only the privilege of 
living free from tyranny was the reward of the common trooper with no 
property.84 Continuing on the problem of suffrage, Rainsborough con-
ceded that property could be estates "butt I deny that {the franchis.!? 
is a propertie to a Lord, to a Gentleman, to any man more then another 
in the Kingdom of England. 1185 As a concession to the request for the 
vote, Cromwell, who also wished to add provisions for the rule of the 
84Pease, Leveller Movement, pp. 215-220. 
85rbid., p. 220. 
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King and a Council of State, proposed a franchise to be extended only to 
those-common men who had served the Army. 86 With such a fir.m conviction 
in the equality of men and the sovereignty of the people, it was impos-
sible for the democrats to accept any compromise. As Sexby expressed 
it, the political motivation of the soldiers seemed to rest on the issue 
of suffrage. 
~we have engaged ••• and ventured our lives and it was all 
for this; to restore our birthrights and privileges as English-
men, ••• But it seems now except a man have a fixed estate in 
this kingdom he hath no right in this kingdom. I wonder we were 
so much deceived.87 
Enigmatically, the Putney debates portrayed the gro-vling differ-
ence between Independency and the Left, but, at the same time, they 
revealed a certain unifonnity of goals. 'When two parties of such bit-
ter opposition were thrown together in a verbal contest over a way of 
life and a system of government, the atmosphere of tension made even 
minor ar~ents unlikely and brought out tactics of debate which further 
complicated the situation. ~fuile the Grandees were not too far from the 
ideals of the Levellers, they were violently opposed to their arguments. 
Both groups saw the necessity of unity, but their means of accomplishing 
it were different.88 Unity to the officers was obedience to their wishes 
on the settlement, but to the radical party, it was consent to govern-
ment by the people. Both Ireton and Lilburne believed in the supremacy 
\/B6Gardiner, Histozx, III, 39();...391. 
87Firth, Cromwell's Army, P• 359. 
tfiBwoodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, [J.2J. 
of the law, but the Levellers used law to limit government and to pro-
teet the people's rights and liberties, while the Independents viewed 
law as a protector of property. 89 
Besides the personalities, the issues, and the argumen~which 
were unfolded at Putney, the significance of these debates lay in the 
34 
open confrontation of the two parties. In pamphlets, letters, and peti-
tions, only one side of the contest was seen at a time; the result was 
that each group presented their doctrines without direct challenge. 
Consequently, as the Agitators grew in prominence and influence over the 
Army, the superior officers were forced to include them in a discussion 
of any proposed settlement and theories to prove the irrationality and 
improbability of the Leveller plan. With superior tactics of debate, 
Cromwell and Ireton defeated the radicals in rationality by standing on 
the legality of compacts and property rights. Yet the emotional, sin-
cere appeal and persistence of the Agitators remained undaunted, for 
they then decided to plead the case of the Agreement directly to the 
soldiers in a general rendezvous.9° Insisting that the nation be ruled 
by an unalterable constitution and not by changeable laws, the Levellers 
urged the soldiers and the people to join in the Agreement to decide the 
extent of Parliament.91 "And were but this agreement established, 
89Pease, Leveller 11ovement, p. 221. 
9°Firth, Cromwell's Army, p. 3S9. 
0lntetters to the Free-Born People of England," quoted in Wood-
house, ed., Puritanism and Libertz, pp. 445-446. 
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doubtless all the grievances of the Army and people would be redressed 
. d" t 1 u92 ~mrne ~a e y •••• 
Inevitably discipline and authority did prevail, and Cromwell 
enforced the strict rules of war and obedience, as necessary for survival. 
Trying to pull the Army out of politics, he maintained that the Houses 
should be left to decide lfwhat is fit for the kingdom.n93 The people 
should only be watchful to see that the Commons was properly representa-
tive. Impressed by the forces and influence of the Agitators and by the 
danger of the principle of manhood suffrage, Cromwell resolved to send 
the agents and officers back to their regiments to quiet the dissatis-
faction among the rank and file and to await the rendezvous. On Novem-
ber 8, the indomitable Independent carried the vote at the final meeting, 
and the Army Council was dissolved.94 Discipline was restored at the 
cost of representation, and thereafter, the actions of the Army were 
decided by the General and the Council of \iar. Fairfax, 'l'lho later 
claimed that the declarations and petitions from the Army had received 
his signature without his approval,95 had threatened to resign his com-
mand unless the agitation was ended. While the Army Council had been 
t/92"Letter to the Officers and Soldiers," quoted in Woodhouse, ed., 
Puritanism and Liberty, W• 44B- 449. 
91irth, Cromwell's Arrrry, p. 360. 
\;94u A Letter from Sev= Agitators to their Regiments, 11 
Woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, pp. 454-455. 
quoted in 
95Lord General, Sir Thomas Fairfax, quoted in C. H. Firth, ed., 
Stuart Tracts, 1603-1693 (Westminister, 1903), p. 363. 
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successful in calming the voices of discontent and in weathering the 
storm of disunity, begun in March of 1647, the body 1A':-1tad.:mly as long as 
the different voices and opinions did not become loud and persistent. 
Its partial success meant the death of the Council, for the persuasive 
declarations and defenses of the Agitatovs could not be tolerated. 
Despite later attempts at revival, the Council and Agitators were lost 
as organs of propaganda for the Leveller doctrines.96 
When the promised rendezvous did take place, the regiments found 
themselves divided in three locations, and therefore, they were unable 
to seriously challenge the imposed quiet and discipline. Despite the 
apparent defeat of the Levellers in the Army, on November 15 two regi-
ments were incited to rebel and appeared with copies of the Ajreement. 
Quickly and harshly~the disturbance was put do\in by Cromwell, who had 
the ringleader of the New Agents shot. After the incident, a general 
reconciliation of opposing parties was enacted, as the Independents 
formed a temporary and unsteady alliance with the Levellers '• 97 Concilia-
tory action continued through November to January of 1645, during which 
time Leveller prisoners were released and some agreement was arranged 
with Parliament. On January 3, a vote in the Commons for no more acl-
dresses to the King was heartily approved by Cromwell, who had moved to 
the Left's position on the issue of restoration. Unity had been 
96Firth, Cromwell's ~, p. 362. 
/ -
[;frrloodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, [Jcjf. 
obtained by the efforts of the Lieutenant-General according to his 
methods and not by the desired Agreement, but the Independents had to 
move even further left in the course of events through 164tl.98 
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CF.APTER VI 
DIRECT AT'rACKS ON THE GRA.l'IDEES M1J THE SEVERAL AGREEMENTS 
As the kingdom became again involved in civil strife by the 
escape of Charles to the Isle of Wight, the Leveller influence was 
curbed. With the exception of a few personal petitions, declarations, 
and defenses, the party of the Left was completely out of the political 
scene. Called to the bar and imprisoned in February for promoting a 
seditious pamphlet, Lilburne and Wildman demanded that the Commons 
either claim sole authority and redress grievances or else declare that 
'it ."Was.·· unable to relieve the people. In a varied list of social, 
political, and economic grievances, it was obvious that the Levellers 
had withdrawn from the Army as their channel of protest. Though the 
party returned to the earlier methods of direct petition, its.· threat 
was sufficient enough that the document was burned and its authors were 
put in prison. Termed seditious and unjust, the petition was taken as 
an effort to make the people disloyal to Parliamentl9 From~ Declaration 
of Some Proceedings, recounting the trial of Lilburne in 164e, it was 
seen that the group around him had gone back to the meetings, organiza-
tion, and manner of protest of the early days of 1647. Yet their come-
back on the political stage did not really occur until the end of the 
war and with the publication of Walwyn's The Bloody Project, which 
99"The earnest Petition of many Free-born People of the Nation," 
quoted in Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, pp. 107-118. 
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merely reaffirmed the old complaints against oppression.100 
Dated August 21, 164~, The Bloody Project repeated the constitu-
tional demands of the earlier petitions, but it also involved leaders of 
the Left in a strong attack on the Grandees. Feeling that all hope for 
redress and reconciliation with Parliament was shattered, the pamphlet 
saw previous abuses now replaced by new ones of equal suppression. The 
Army had forgotten its responsibility and promises to the kingdom and to 
the soldiers. 11 ••• All the quarrell we have at this day in the King-
dome, is no other than a quarrell of Interests, and Partyes, a pulling 
down of one Tyrant, to set up another, and instead of Liberty, heaping 
upon our selves a greater slavery than we fought against. rr101 Finally 
the printed attack demanded that Parliament do whatever was conducive to 
settling the kingdom and relieving the people. 
Political agitation in the fall of 164~ was once again considered 
~~ .... 
with mistrust of the Grandees and~the establishment of a constitutional 
scheme, but the situation in England had changed from 1647. Now that 
Charles had been completely defeated and withdrawn from the issues of 
the kingdom, the question arose over the disposal of the person and the 
office.l02 Since the last civil war could be blamed only on the King, 
the Levellers urged punishment for Charles and a constitution which 
lOOHaller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, P• 15. 
lOJ.william l<Ialwyn, "The Bloody Project," Haller and Davies, eds., 
Leveller Tracts, pp. 135-145. 
102c. H. Firth, IIJohn Lilburne, 11 Dictionary~ National~­
graphy, XI, 1125. 
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would abolish the Lords and Monarchy. Due to the recent violence and 
hatred of the King, the petition of September 11, 164U, had more influ-
ence and support than any Leveller document of 1647.103 
Meeting at the Whalebone in London, Lilburne and other leaders 
drew up The Humble Petition and presented it to Parliament with. the sig-
natures of 40,000 people. The significance of the pamphlet lay in the 
fact that it represented the principal statement of Leveller ideals and 
it became the basis of the Agreement of the People, drawn up for Army 
debate in December of 1648. Outlined in three sections, The Humble 
Petition explained why the people had s~ed with Parliament against the 
King, told what apprehensions still remained in the kingdom, and enumera-
I 
ted what things the people still desired. Claiming the Commons as the 
highest authority in the land, the petitioners had expected that author-
ity to defend them and to redress their grievances. The great fear in 
the radical group was the return of monarchy, which might again embroil 
the country in a conflict over supreme authority. By the recent rising 
against the people, it was obvious that the King was contemptuous of 
their safety and freedom. In a long list of constitutional provisions, 
the petition told what was needed for the welfare of the people and for 
the future protection of their rights. Included in the enumeration were 
legal and parliamentary demands such as: the supreme authority of the 
Commons, yearly elections, a set time of meeting and dissolution, reli-
gious freedom over civil authorities, equality under the law, trial by 
~03Tanner, Constitutional Conflicts, p. 152. 
jury and not by the Lords, simpler law proceedings, law written in Eng-
lish, and no self-incrimination. Economic demands included help for the 
poor, the removal of the excise tax and the abolition of monopolies. A 
variety of requests, from defining the position of the Lords to paying 
the Army, completed the statement of the Levellers.~04 After several 
determining events had occurred through the autumn of 1648, the Army 
leaders found it necessar,y to reach an agreement with the Left, who used 
the petition of September 11 as the basic viewpoint of the party. 
Necessity was usually the mother of Oliver Cromwell's political 
inventions, for once again in 1648, the situation in the kingdom led him 
to reverse his previous commitments. Always true to the authority of 
Parliament, he was extremely hesitant about moving against the legal 
establishment. Even though the Commons had defiantly ignored the com-
plaints of the Army and had continued with orders for disbandment, the 
political commander had refused to move against London and the Legisla-
ture. In contrast, the Cromwell of 1648 was in no position to turn away 
from the responsibility of settling the peace--a job which had to be 
done without the restoration of Charles I. ~lhen Parliament resumed 
negotiations with the King in October, the Army, which had just com-
pleted its second war against Charles, was thoroughly aroused. Such a 
threat could not be overlooked and the Remonstrance of the ~ was pre-
sented to the Council of Officers on November 10. It was immediately 
104John Lilburne, "The Bumble Petition, 11 Haller and Davies, eds., 
Leveller Tracts, pp. 147-155. 
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approved and sent on to the Commons on the ltlth of the month.105 Be-
sides demanding justice against those responsible for the war, the peti-
tion asked to make the sons of the present King incapable of ruling Eng-
land. With no reply from Parliament, the Army acted illegally and radi-
cally by seizing the King at Newport and marching toward London to 
106 threaten the Commons. 
With the Army and Parliament once again at odds, the Independents 
found it expedient to work temporarily with the Left. Ireton not only 
conferred with the Levellers, but also accepted the definite influence 
of Lilburne in the Remonstrance and the proposal for an Agreement. In 
return for the concessions made to the party, he accepted the idea to 
end Parliament and ~9-~le by a cow~ttee until a new constitution and 
.~-.. -... -·· 
_,,.,..,.J''-"''"" 
the new representatives could be approved. On November 30, the Council 
of Officers instructed the House to dissolve and follovred up the demand 
by arriving in London on December 2, 164tl. Still shying from the idea 
of a military ~~' the Independents decided to purge rather than to 
dissolve that body. Pride's Purge was thereby enacted on the 6th of 
December.107 Without any hint of their ambitions, the Army declaration 
for the march to London stated that they desired 11a just and safe settle-
ment of the kingdom upon such foundations as have been propounded by:us 
and others for that purpose.n108 Yet power was handed over to the 
I 
\1 105woodhouse, ed. , Puritanism and Liberty, {)y. 
l06Firth, Cromwell's Army, p. 363. 
Vfl07woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, LJ57· 
V108Ibid.' p. 466. -
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Council of Officers, who held both the authority in the Army and the 
control over Parliament, where less than eighty members were left in the 
Independent Rump. 109 
Foreseeing the overbalance of power, the Levellers had met at 
Nag's Head Tavern in N0vernber to discuss the desired settlement. In a 
statement of their intentions, they pressed for an agreement,before the 
King was executed and before Parliament was purged1 in order to keep an 
equilibrium of tyranny. Wanting security before the Grandees were left 
in command, the Left requested a meeting of representatives from the 
Army and from every county. From past experience, especially at Putney, 
Lilburne was afraid of delay tactics, so consequently, he pressed for an 
Agreement immediately.110 In recognition ' , a committee of sixteen, 
composed of four representatives from the Army, Parliament, the Level-
lers, and the Independents, respectively, was appointed to discuss the 
proper and just settlement of the kingdom.111 Therefore, only a few 
days after the purge, the Levellers prematurely drew up an Agreement 
which forced the hand of the officers to debate the document. With the 
expressed purpose of offering the plan of government to the nation, 
Lilburne published his Agreement on December 15, 1648, to give men the 
"opportunity to consider the equity thereof, and offer their reasons 
v/i09Tanner, Constitutional Conflicts, p. 152. 
\,lilO John Lilburne, "Legal Fundamentall Liberties," quoted in Wood-
house, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, pp. 342-346. -
J111\-J'oodhouse, ed~ Puritanism and Liberty, /)'{! • 
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against anything ••• before it be concluded..u112 
When it was concluded, the plan of the radicals brought on a 
fierce debate in the Council o~ Officers at Whitehall from December 16th 
to January 6, 1649.113 Soon in the discussion, it became apparent that 
the plans for publication of the ~reement £! ~ People had two differ-
ent interpretations. To the Grandees, it was intended as a representa-
tion for the approval of Parliament, but the Levellers aimed to distri-
bute the constitution for subscriptions from the Council of War, from 
the regiments, and from all the people.114 Accounts of the several 
weeks t debate further showed that Ireton, the "eyes and earsn115 of the 
Independents, was not as close to democratic thought as was first sup-
posed by his consent to an agreement. Despite all argument, he made 
changes in the original plan, refused to allow complete liberty of con-
science, and gave Parliament the right to punish without due process of 
law.~n the Agreement presented to the Rump on January 20, 1649, not 
only was the right to worship denied to non-Christians, Papists, and 
Prelates, but also civil magistrates kept same of their former control 
over religious instructions and discipline. Detailed provisions were 
v,2 ll John Lilbume, nAn Agreement of the People, 11 Woodhouse, ed. , 
Puritanism~ Liberty, p. 355. 
v'113John Lilburne, "A Plea for Common Right and Freedom," Wood-
house, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, p. 467. 
\_, ll4J ohn Lilburne, "Legal Fundament all Liberties," Woodhouse, 
ed., Puritanism and Libertz, pp. 348-350. 
vll5Ibid., p. 347. 
!i16Ibid., p. 348. 
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made for the distribution of parliamentary seats, but the Leveller plan 
for manhood suffrage was sensibly restricted to require a man to be a 
housekeeper and a wage earner. Though supreme authority was given to 
representatives in civil affairs, the Agreement did reserve certain fun-
damental rights for the people and planned for the executive power in a 
Council of State.117 
Both the differences in handling the Agreement and the additions 
made by Ireton confirmed the judgment made by a Royalist in Mercurius 
Pragmaticus: 11The grandees and the Levellers can as soon combine as 
fire and water; the one aim at a pure democracy, the others at an oli-
garchy.n118 In contrast to the Grandee designs of rule by the minority, 
which would have to be upheld by the military, the plan of the Left 
would have had to be propagandized by local agents. If the people had 
been able to choose their own form of government, as the Levellers pro-
posed, the decision probably would have been for the restoration of 
monarchy. Yet the organization and method of subscription could have 
won the populace to acceptance of a petition. Describing the system 
which would present the Agreement, a hostile writer claimed the Level-
lers "have Agents of their own in all Quarters of the Army, the Coun-
ties abroad, and the City of London, to draw in Persons to subscribe 
to the aforesaid damned particulars.nll9 Though the concept of govern-
ll?Gardiner, ed., Constitutional Documents, pp. 360-370. 
~18aooch, English Democratic~' p. 167. 
ll9Pease, Leveller Movement, p. 236. 
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ment by consent was reasonable and lawful, Cromwell could not allow any 
civil action to take precedence over military pm-1er.120 What he planned 
was rule with an iron hand' and the Agreement was discussed and drawn up 
only to pacify the Left until he could afford to suppress .,_.it and set 
up the Commonwealth. After the King was charged with betraying the fun-
damental laws and liberties on January 6, was tried, and at :last was 
executed,121 the Grandees were free from two powers of opposition--Par-
liament ar:rl the King. With all military and civil power in the hands of 
the Lieutenant-General, the only possible source of trouble was the 
Leveller party, which was quickly and surely put down. 
When the Grandees dropped the idea of an agreement, a petition 
was drawn up from the soldiers to protest an unrepresentative Council of 
Officers acting in the name of the Army. As the first in a series of 
attacks from February to fall, this protest was handled by Cromwell)who 
restricted petitions from being sent to the Commons) and said that any 
pleas '·10uld have to go through the military channel to the General. As 
the Leveller movement now consisted of an outside group of extremists, 
their influence in the Army in a positive, constructive sense had died 
with the Agreement of the People in January of 1649. Though the appeals 
to the army now managed to incite an occasional mutiny, their political 
contribution bad come primarily through the Agitators and New Agents of 
the Army. When the voice and petitions of the soldiers to Parliament 
120Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 34. 
121Firth and Rait, eds., ~~Ordinances, I, 253. 
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had been to his advantage, Cromwell had accepted their representatives 
in the debates and in an Army Council. Suspicious and deeply resentful, 
many soldiers planned to reappoint Agitators and revive the Army Council, 
but the petition was termed seditious and the authors were punished.122 
Now that the cry of the rank and file was levied against its superior 
officers, the Grandees called it mutiny.l23 
Though the democrats·:.:;, had long pleaded for the abolition of the 
negative voice from the King or Lords, the acts passed by the Rump to 
abolish the kingship on Harch 11;24 and to abolish the House of Lords on 
March 19;25 were certainly no sign the Levellers had gotten part of 
their program passed. Executive authority now passed to the Council 
of Stata., Set. up in February of 1649, it was even more tyrannical in 
suppression of petitions, imprisonment of political opponents, and abso-
lute control over the kingdom. Censorship and other restrictions on the 
rank and file caused Lilburne to say that by the nature of the Council 
of State, "our Liberties have bin more deeply wounded, than since the 
.J-26 beginning of this Parliament; and that to the dislike of the Souldiery.' 
Violent in their condemnation of the present executive body, the Leveller 
122Firth, Cromwell's Army, p. 366. 
123Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 18. 
12~irth and Rait, eds., Acts and Ordinances, II, ltl. 
125rbid.' p. 24. 
126John Lilburne, "England's New Chains Discovered," Haller and 
Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 162. 
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leaders blamed all the misery of the nation on the evil designs of Cram-
well and Ireton, who had deceitfully tricked and lied their way to com-
plete dominance. By any method of obtaining power--replacing officers, 
punishing political objectors, or allying with former enemies--the 
Grandees had slowly proceeded to power over the last months from the 
breach of promises made at Newmarket in June, 1647, to the overlooking 
of the Agreement in January of 164~.127 
In the questioning of Lilburne, Overton, Prince 1 and Walwyn before 
the Council of State in March of 1649, Cromwell expressively summarized 
the whole matter of influence and interaction between the Grandees and 
the Levellers. In stating the conflict he said, 1~ou have no other way 
to deale with these men, but to break them • • • [OiJ they will break 
you. 1112~ One or the other of the parties had to prevail, for their 
political theories were not compatible. 
Gardiner, who was sympathetic to Lilburne and his group until he 
angrily attacked Cromwell, felt that the Leveller party lost all because 
they were uncompromising and persistent in every demand.129 Too revolu-
tionary for their day, the Levellers drew their political theory from 
political situations. Suffering from injustice, they constructed a 
theory to counteract the oppression.13° Democratic in their organization 
127~., p. 164. 
128Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 21. 
129Ibid., p. 34. 
l3°Pease, Leveller Movement, p. 238. 
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and their concept of government by consent, the party platform probably 
would have been harmful if completely carried out, for the common man 
of the day had no ideas or experience in political participation.l3l 
Though there were several drawbacks and disadvantages of the democratic 
group, the threat came with the mood and desires of the common soldiers, 
who together comprised a mighty force in the kingdom. From the mild 
petitions for arrears, to the organization and debates of the Agitators, 
to the negotiations within existing forms of government, and finally to 
the Agreement for a new basis of settlement, the Levellers had made 
their influence felt to this purpose, 11for what is done to anyone, may 
be done to everyone: besides, being all members of one body, that is, 
of the English Commonwealth, one man should not suffer wrongfully, but 
all should be sensible, and endeavour his preservation." 13~ 
131Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 36. 
132Ibid., p.3.3. 
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